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Abstract Software health management (SWHM) tech-
niques complement the rigorous veriﬁcation and valida-
tion processes that are applied to safety-critical systems
prior to their deployment. These techniques are used
to monitor deployed software in its execution environ-
ment, serving as the last line of defense against the
eﬀects of a critical fault. SWHM monitors use informa-
tion from the speciﬁcation and implementation of the
monitored software to detect violations, predict pos-
sible failures, and help the system recover from faults.
Changes to the monitored software, such as adding new
functionality or ﬁxing defects, therefore, have the po-
tential to impact the correctness of both the monitored
software and the SWHM monitor. In this work, we
describe how the results of a software change impact
analysis technique, Directed Incremental Symbolic Ex-
ecution (DiSE), can be applied to monitored software
to identify the potential impact of the changes on the
SWHM monitor software. The results of DiSE can then
be used by other analysis techniques, e.g., testing, de-
bugging, to help preserve and improve the integrity of
the SWHM monitor as the monitored software evolves.
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1 Introduction
The size and complexity of software in safety-critical
systems have increased considerably over time, due in
part to the addition of richer feature sets, more au-
tomation, and continued eﬀorts to improve the safety
and reliability of these systems. As a result, the task of
verifying and validating these larger and more complex
software systems has become much more challenging
and time consuming, requiring new techniques to help
ensure the reliability1 and correctness of safety-critical
systems.
Software health management (SWHM) techniques
have recently been developed to complement the vari-
ous veriﬁcation and validation processes applied to safety-
critical systems prior to their deployment [12,29,37–39].
Monitors are at the core of these techniques. SWHM
monitors observe and analyze the system in its execu-
tion environment during runtime to detect and respond
to violations, and to predict possible failures in the near
future. These monitors are often implemented as soft-
ware components, and as a result also require some level
of analysis to ensure their correctness and reliability.
The analysis of monitors is important because moni-
tors often serve as a last line of defense against the po-
tentially catastrophic eﬀects of faults in safety-critical
systems.
Software changes are inevitable in most deployed
systems - successful software systems evolve as require-
ments change and defects are ﬁxed. Even in safety-
critical systems, software is rarely exempt from change
after deployment. For example, the discovery of a crit-
ical defect (bug) in the system may require an update
to the operational software to avoid a system failure.
1 We use the term reliability to mean ‘continuity of correct
service’ as speciﬁed in [4].
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Systems also undergo change when new functionality
is added. Changing operational software, however, is
known to be risky. Even small changes to the code
can have a major impact on how the software executes.
Moreover, bug ﬁxes may not always ﬁx the defect and
can potentially introduce new defects. For example, a
recent study showed that 14.8%–24.4% of the sampled
ﬁxes for post-release bugs in several large, mature oper-
ating systems were incorrect and had a negative impact
on the end users [48].
SWHM monitors use information from the speciﬁ-
cation and implementation of the monitored software
to determine which values to analyze and to determine
tolerance ranges for those values. This tight coupling of
monitor and monitored software means that the impact
of a change to the monitored software has the potential
to also impact the SWHM monitor and its correctness
in the context of the change. Various change impact
analysis techniques have been developed to identify the
diﬀerences between two program versions in order to
guide testing and veriﬁcation eﬀorts on the changed
software [1,6,14,17,20,28,36,45]. The objective of these
techniques is to reduce the time and cost of testing and
veriﬁcation of the changed system by guiding the anal-
ysis towards the parts of the system impacted by the
changes. However, to the best of our knowledge, change
impact analysis techniques have not been explored in
the context of how information about changes to mon-
itored software can be used to help identify the impact
of the changes on the SWHM monitor.
In previous work [28,34], we present Directed Incre-
mental Symbolic Execution (DiSE), a change impact
analysis technique for computing the eﬀects of program
changes in terms of program execution behaviors. The
DiSE technique can be used throughout the software
development lifecycle, to help guide software engineer-
ing tasks such as testing, debugging, and regression ver-
iﬁcation tasks whenever software changes are necessary.
In this work, we explore how the results of DiSE, ap-
plied to the monitored software, can be further lever-
aged in order to maintain and improve the integrity of
SWHM monitor software. The main contributions of
our work include:
– We describe how the results of the DiSE change im-
pact analysis on monitored software can be used to
identify the impact of the changes on the SWHM
monitor software.
– We apply our technique to a system with a SWHM
monitor modeled as a Bayesian network and evalu-
ate its cost and eﬀectiveness with the following two
research questions:
RQ1: How does the cost of applying DiSE to the
monitored software compare with using tradi-
tional symbolic execution to compute the impact
of the changes?
RQ2: How does the number of impacted path condi-
tions generated by DiSE compare with the num-
ber path conditions generated by traditional sym-
bolic execution?
– We describe how the results of DiSE on the mon-
itored software can be used to help validate and
update the SWHM monitor software to preserve
and improve its integrity as the monitored software
evolves.
2 Software Health Management
The size and complexity of software in safety-critical
systems is increasing rapidly as more components are
added to facilitate automation. The number of sensors
and actuators on aircraft has steadily increased over
time, as has the software to control and monitor these
devices. More sophisticated algorithms for the autopi-
lot, navigation, collision detection and avoidance, and
other on-board systems, have also contributed to the
increase in software. In recent times, we have also seen
a shift of responsibilities from pilots to automated sys-
tems for a large number of tasks. In the next generation
of aircraft, we expect to see continued growth in the size
and complexity of the software to enable even more au-
tomation in these systems.
Rigorous design, veriﬁcation, and certiﬁcation pro-
cesses have been established to check the correctness
of safety-critical software before it is deployed. How-
ever, the size and complexity of the systems prohibit
exhaustive testing and veriﬁcation. Moreover, it may
not be possible to anticipate or re-create particular en-
vironmental conditions for veriﬁcation purposes, and
therefore parts of the system may not be tested prior
to deployment. In order to address these limitations,
SWHM techniques have been proposed to monitor the
software after it is deployed.
Building on decades of research in systems and ve-
hicle management, together with research in software
runtime veriﬁcation, SWHM techniques [12,29,38,39]
have been developed to support monitoring of software
as it executes and interacts with the hardware (sensors
and actuators) after deployment. SWHM monitors per-
form fault detection, isolation and recovery. They can
also monitor for assumption violations and other con-
ditions that are useful in post-ﬂight analysis. Software
health management software often serves as a guardian
to the system during its operational phase, ensuring its
correct and safe operation.
Software health managers have been developed to
monitor the values of sensors and variables in software,
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as well as updates to these variables, the health of the
sensors and variables, and also to compute the likeli-
hood of failure using Bayesian networks [38,39]. Soft-
ware health managers have also been developed to mon-
itor the health of components in the system; detect-
ing anomalies, identifying and isolating the fault causes
of the anomalies (when feasible), prognosticating fu-
ture faults, and when possible, mitigating the eﬀects of
faults [12]. Software monitors have also been generated
and used in embedded systems with hard real-time con-
straints, to sample variables in the monitored software
and implement fault tolerant algorithms to determine
the health of the monitored software [29].
SWHM systems have been implemented at both the
model-level [38,39] and at the code-level [12,29]. Model-
level systems are tested using model simulations on a
wide range of sensor inputs and various values for inter-
nal parameters. The analysis of the model is intended
to provide conﬁdence in the correctness of the expected
behavior of the model. Code-level SWHM systems often
have the same V&V requirements as the monitored soft-
ware, e.g., to achieve a particular level of code coverage
during testing, and they are expected to satisfy similar
veriﬁcation conditions as the monitored software.
In addition to functional properties, SWHM mon-
itor software is typically expected to preserve certain
non-functional properties, such as non-interference and
timing properties. For example, SWHM monitors must
not interfere with the monitored software, e.g., change
the behavior of the monitored software (unless the mon-
itored property has violated a contract). They must also
avoid corrupting any data or causing any crashes in
the system. SWHM monitors also must not miss vio-
lations or alarms, and should minimize the number of
false alarms.
The veriﬁcation and validation of SWHM monitor
software, similar to any other software, is an ongoing
process that is necessary throughout the development
lifecycle to ensure changes to the system have their in-
tended eﬀects and that no unintended behaviors were
introduced by the changes. In the case of SWHM moni-
tors, veriﬁcation and validation of the monitor may also
be required when the monitored software is changed,
due to the tight coupling between the monitor and the
monitored software, e.g., through the values that are
monitored. Techniques that identify what is changed
and the impact of the changes on the SWHM moni-
tor play an important role in maintaining the health
(correctness) of SWHM monitor software. Before pre-
senting our technique for maintaining the health of soft-
ware monitors, we ﬁrst provide background on software
change impact analysis techniques and discuss some of
the challenges associated with computing precise soft-
ware change impact information.
3 Change Impact Analysis
Software change impact analysis techniques [3] are used
to detect the parts of a program aﬀected by the changes
made to the code. Given the evolutionary nature of
software development, these techniques play a critical
role in software development and maintenance, where
even a one line ﬁx can potentially have unintended and
even disastrous consequences. The results computed by
change impact analysis techniques have been widely
used to support software maintenance tasks, such as re-
gression testing [21,23,33,41], regression veriﬁcation [5,
40], studying changes in large code bases [32], and for
automated generation of program documentation [7].
Given two closely related program versions, change
impact analysis techniques are performed in two steps:
1) compute the diﬀerences between program versions,
i.e., the change set, and 2) using the change set as in-
put, compute the impact of the the diﬀerences, i.e., the
impact set. The change set can be computed based on a
variety of program representations. Computing changes
based on source code is commonly used in practise be-
cause it is eﬃcient and automated. The diﬀerencing
techniques based on textual diﬀerences, however, are
often sensitive to formatting and syntactic changes that
may not aﬀect the way the program executes.
Diﬀerences computed based on some graphical rep-
resentation of the code, e.g., Abstract Syntax Tree (AST),
Program Dependence Graph (PDG), Control-Flow Graph
(CFG), are in general, more precise than diﬀerences
computed on the source code as is. The graphical repre-
sentations of code encode additional information about
the program, e.g., control and data dependences, that
is useful for computing more precisely the impact of
source code changes. Any technique, however, that com-
putes change impact based strictly on diﬀerences in the
source code structure will have limited capabilities to
reason about the impact of the changes on the execution
of the code. This is especially true when dynamically
allocated data and complex control structures such as
loops and recursion are present in the program.
Once the change set is computed, change impact
analysis techniques compute which parts of the program
may be impacted by the changes. The impact of changes
can be computed using information from a static repre-
sentation of the program or using dynamic information
obtained through program execution. Techniques such
as [2] analyze a static representation of the program
to compute the impact set in terms of program state-
ments that may be directly or indirectly impacted by
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the changes to the source code. Godefroid et al. stati-
cally check whether previously-computed symbolic test
summaries are still valid, i.e., not impacted by code
changes, to support compositional dynamic test gener-
ation [13].
Techniques which use dynamic information [20,33]
have the potential to compute more precise impact sets
because they are based on actual program execution
paths. Dynamic analysis is typically driven using a set
of test cases, so the impact sets will be computed with
respect to the speciﬁc execution paths explored, which
may be a small subset of all feasible execution paths.
Other recent work has explored the use of symbolic ex-
ecution results to compute precise change impact char-
acterizations by systematically exploring the program
execution space [15,31,27,42,45]. The results of these
change impact analysis techniques have been used to
support a range of software evolution tasks, including
test case selection and test suite augmentation; how-
ever, scalability is an issue for these techniques.
The change impact analysis used in this work, Di-
rected Incremental Symbolic Execution (DiSE) [28,34],
combines the eﬃciency of static program analysis tech-
niques with the precision of dynamic analysis techniques
to compute the impact of software changes in terms of
program execution behaviors. This approach results in
a more precise impact set than using static analysis
alone, and also addresses the scalability issues associ-
ated with symbolic execution by using the results of the
static analysis to direct symbolic execution towards the
parts of the program impacted by the changes. This ef-
fectively ‘prunes’ the program behaviors that are not
impacted by the changes to the code. Because the re-
sults of DiSE are computed in terms of program exe-
cution paths, they can be used to support a range of
software maintenance tasks, including regression test-
ing, debugging and regression veriﬁcation.
In the following sections we describe the DiSE al-
gorithm and illustrate how the impact set for a small
working example is computed. We then describe a novel
application of DiSE results computed on the monitored
software to help maintain and improve the integrity of
the SWHM monitor software.
4 Directed Incremental Symbolic Execution
Directed Incremental Symbolic Execution (DiSE) [28,
34] is a program analysis technique for computing the
impact of changes to software. The output of DiSE is a
characterization of the eﬀects of code changes on pro-
gram execution behaviors. The eﬀects are character-
ized in terms of the inputs to the program and the ef-
fects of execution on variables in the program. In pre-
vious work [5,28,34] we describe how DiSE is a general
change impact analysis and how the change impact re-
sults computed by DiSE can be used for various soft-
ware maintenance and evolution tasks, including test
case selection and prioritization for regression testing,
debugging, and regression veriﬁcation. In this work we
describe a novel application of DiSE results to soft-
ware health management and discuss how the results
computed by DiSE can be used to help ensure the cor-
rect operation of a SWHMmonitor when the monitored
software is changed.
The novelty of the DiSE change impact analysis
is to leverage the eﬃciencies of static analysis tech-
niques for computing the impact of program changes to
guide a more precise analysis technique, symbolic exe-
cution, to explore and characterize program execution
paths that may be impacted by the changes. Our work
was inspired by Regression Model Checking (RMC),
a technique which uses the results of a static analysis
to explore the ‘dangerous’ elements in the state space
whose behavior may be impacted by the changes to
the code [46]. DiSE diﬀers from RMC in that DiSE is
based on incremental symbolic execution, rather than
model checking, and DiSE does not require analysis re-
sults to be carried forward as the software evolves -
only the source code for two related program versions
is required.
An overview of the DiSE analysis is shown in Fig. 1.
The inputs to DiSE are two related program versions:
the original source (S) and the modiﬁed source (S′),
and a source-level syntactic diﬀ between S and S′. The
source-level diﬀ provides information about the source
code lines that are changed, added, and removed be-
tween S and S′. A control ﬂow graph (CFG) for S′,
shown in Fig. 1, is constructed from the source of S′
and used to guide symbolic execution towards impacted
program behaviors.
There are two phases of analysis in DiSE. Phase I
estimates the impact of the diﬀerences on the source
code of S′. Phase II uses the information generated in
phase I to compute, with better precision, the impact of
the changes on the program execution behaviors. The
two phases are shown in Fig. 1. The output of DiSE
is the set of program behaviors in S′ impacted by the
diﬀerences between S and S′. The set of Impacted Pro-
gram Behaviors can then be used to identify the impact
of the changes on the software health manager (SWHM
Monitor) responsible for monitoring the software, as
demonstrated in Fig. 1.
In the remainder of this section we describe each
phase of DiSE. In Section 5 we describe how the results
Maintaining the Health of Software Monitors 5
Phase II
s0
s1 s2
s3
s4 s5
s6
s7
Original
Source(S)
Modified
Source(S ′)
CFG(S ′) n0
n1
n3
n2
n4
n5 n7 n8
n9n10n6
nend
φl0 ∧ φl1 ∧ . . .
∨φk0 ∧ φk1 ∧ . . .
∨φj0 ∧ φj1 ∧ . . .
∨φi0 ∧ φi1 ∧ . . .
Directed
Incremental
Symbolic
Diff
Execution
SWHM Monitor
Program Behaviors
Impacted
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
Phase I
Fig. 1 Overview of DiSE. The inputs to DiSE are two syn-
tactically similar program versions, S and S′, and a source-
level diﬀ between S and S′. The output of DiSE is a set of
impacted program behaviors that can be used to manage the
health of a SWHM monitor.
of DiSE can be used to help identify the impact of the
changes on the software health manager.
4.1 Source Impact Analysis
In the ﬁrst phase of DiSE, information about the added,
removed and changed lines of code is used by data-
and control-ﬂow analyses to mark additional lines of
code that may be impacted by the diﬀerences between
S and S′. The static analysis computes the impact of
the changes by analyzing a control-ﬂow graph repre-
sentation of the source code. A data-ﬂow analysis is
used to identify where variables are deﬁned and used,
but the concrete (actual) values of variables in the pro-
gram that are possible within its environment are not
computed. This under-approximation of the execution
environment makes the analysis eﬃcient and scalable to
larger programs. Furthermore, the analyses in phase I
are conservative, i.e., every source line of code that may
be impacted by the change, will be marked as impacted.
This ensures that the source impact analysis does not
miss marking any instructions that are impacted by the
changes, although it may also mark code as impacted,
when in fact, it is not.
Consider the annotated control ﬂow graph (CFG)
for the modiﬁed source, S′ in Fig. 1. Each node in
the CFG (n0 . . . n9 and nend) represents a single line
of source code. Nodes n0 and nend are the respective
entry and exit nodes to the program. All nodes in the
CFG are reachable from n0, and nend is reachable from
all nodes in the CFG. The edges between the nodes
represent the ﬂow of control between the diﬀerent pro-
gram statements during execution. The shaded node,
n2, represents the changed source line of code based on
the results of the source-level diﬀ comparing S and S′.
During the source impact analysis phase of DiSE,
impacted nodes are computed by starting with the set
of changed nodes and then using data- and control-ﬂow
information to compute the impacted nodes (program
statements). In Fig. 1, the nodes annotated with ‘∗’ (n0,
n2, n4, n7, n8, n9, n10, and nend) represent the source
lines impacted by the change. The output of this anal-
ysis is the set of source lines of code in S′ impacted by
the diﬀerences between S and S′. This information is
used to direct the more precise analysis, symbolic ex-
ecution, in phase II of DiSE. In the remainder of this
section we provide a high-level description of the DiSE
algorithm. The reader is referred to [28,34] for a de-
tailed description of the analyses implemented in DiSE.
4.1.1 Estimating Impact Based on Control Flow
Conditional branch statements, e.g., if and while, com-
pare the values of the speciﬁed variables and constants
and then follow the appropriate branch based on the
results of the comparison. Explicit changes to a condi-
tional statement, i.e., changes to the comparison oper-
ator or the operands, may impact which code block is
executed as a result of the change. For example, con-
sider the following code fragment:
int condTest(int x){
1: if (x > 0)
2: return x + 1;
3: else
4: return x - 1;
5: }
This code returns x + 1 when the input value of x is
greater than 0, and when the input value of x is not
greater than 0, the code returns x−1. The execution be-
havior of this code can be summarized in various ways.
An example summarization based on the program in-
puts and outputs is: “for any input value of x, the pro-
gram never returns 0 or 1.” Suppose the comparison
operator at line 1 is changed to ‘>=’. As a result of the
change to the code, the execution behavior of the pro-
gram is impacted and can now be summarized as—“for
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any input value of x, the program never returns 0 or
−1.” This example demonstrates how a change to the
comparison operation of a conditional branch statement
impacts the behavior of the program.
Recall that the source impact analysis does not con-
sider the execution environment of the program, i.e.,
the possible values of x during runtime. Instead, the
analysis will conservatively estimate that the change in
the conditional branch statement will impact all state-
ments whose execution are dependent on the result of
the comparison operation. For the condTest example
shown above, when the comparison operator is changed
at line 1, the analysis estimates both line 2 and line 4 to
be impacted. The analysis considers all changes to con-
ditional branch statements, including the addition and
deletion of conditional branch statements, when esti-
mating the impact of the changes on the control ﬂow of
the program.
4.1.2 Estimating Impact Based on Data Flow
Changes to an assignment statement in a program may
impact the value of program variables. And, as a result,
other assignment statements, return statements, and
comparison operations that execute after the changed
assignment statement and use (read) the changed value
may also be impacted by the change. Consider the fol-
lowing code fragment:
int dataTest(int x){
1: x = x + 1;
2: tmp = 0;
3: if (x > 0)
4: tmp = x + 1;
5: else
6: tmp = x - 1;
7: return tmp;
8: }
In this example, suppose the assignment to x at line
1 is changed to x = x − 1. Using a data-ﬂow analy-
sis (which also takes into account the control ﬂow of
the program), the analysis would then identify the im-
pacted statements as: (a) the assignment statements at
lines 4 and 6 where the value of x is used to compute
the value assigned to the tmp variable, (b) the condi-
tional branch statement at line 3 where the value of x
is read and compared with 0, and (c) the return state-
ment that reads the value of tmp. Note that the return
statement is marked as impacted because a transitive
closure is computed for the data-ﬂow analysis.
The source impact analysis performed in phase I
of DiSE is guaranteed to terminate. In the worst case,
all of the source lines in the program are marked as
impacted. Such a case would generally be observed for
a program that has a very high coupling between its
components and variables. Another case is when the
change is made to a part of the program that interacts
with all of the other parts of the program. In general, we
do not expect the small, incremental changes made to a
system to impact the entire program. The complexity of
the source impact analysis is polynomial in the number
of source lines of code.
4.2 Directed Symbolic Execution
Before we present the details of the second phase of
DiSE, we ﬁrst provide a brief description of symbolic
execution.
4.2.1 Symbolic Execution
Symbolic execution [9,19] is a non-standard approach
to program execution that uses symbolic values in place
of concrete (actual) values for program inputs. The out-
put values are computed as expressions deﬁned over
constants and the symbolic input values, and using a
speciﬁed set of operators. To illustrate symbolic execu-
tion, we use the following code fragment:
int y;
...
int testX(int x){
1: if (x > 0)
2: return y + 1;
3: else
4: return y - 1;
5: }
To perform symbolic execution on this code fragment,
two symbolic variables are used: Y represents the sym-
bolic value of the integer ﬁeld y, and X is the symbolic
integer value used to represent x, the integer argument
to testX. During symbolic execution, a path condition
is used to collect constraints on the program inputs
that will result in execution of the current path. In this
example, symbolic execution computes two path condi-
tions: (1) when X > 0, the value Y +1 is returned, and
(2) when ¬(X > 0), the value of Y −1 is returned. The
program behavior summarization would be as follows:
1. X > 0 ∧ ret == Y + 1
2. ¬(X > 0) ∧ ret == Y − 1
where ret indicates the return value of the method.
During symbolic execution, the current path condi-
tion is checked for satisﬁability. A decision procedure
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is used to check if there exists an assignment of val-
ues to the program variables that will make the con-
straints in the path condition satisﬁable (true). When
the constraints on the path condition are not satisﬁ-
able, the execution path is marked as infeasible. The
execution stops along an infeasible path and the search
backtracks. In programs with loops and recursion, in-
ﬁnitely long execution paths may be generated. In or-
der to guarantee termination of the execution in such
cases, a user-speciﬁed depth bound is provided as input
to symbolic execution. Whenever the size of the current
execution path reaches this user-speciﬁed depth bound,
the search backtracks.
At the end of symbolic execution, all of the path
conditions generated are collected into a symbolic sum-
mary. Each path condition in the symbolic summary
represents a set of (feasible) concrete execution paths.
The path conditions in a symbolic summary can be used
as input to other program analysis techniques, such as
regression testing. For example, the values of a solved
path condition form the set of concrete input values
that will cause the program to execute that path in the
program, and as such can be used to generate or select
regression tests.
4.2.2 Computing Impacted Path Conditions
The second phase of DiSE performs a form of incremen-
tal symbolic execution on the modiﬁed version of the
program. DiSE directs symbolic execution to explore
only the parts of the program that are impacted by the
changes to the code. DiSE leverages the set of impacted
source lines computed in the previous phase, and the
reachability information encoded in the CFG as input
in order to explore a subset of the feasible execution
paths. When no impacted statements are reachable on
the current path, symbolic execution backtracks, avoid-
ing the cost of unnecessarily exploring and characteriz-
ing execution paths in the modiﬁed version of the pro-
gram that are not impacted by the change(s) to the
program.
There is another important aspect of pruning within
DiSE that sets it apart from other change-impact anal-
ysis techniques. DiSE prunes certain symbolic execu-
tion paths by exploring only a subset of the possible
choices. DiSE may prune choices at conditional branch
statements, e.g., when these statements are not marked
as impacted in phase I, even if other impacted source
lines are reachable from the block. We demonstrate the
intuition for this pruning through an example:
int a, b;
int pruneTest(int x, int y){
1: if ( x > 0 )
2: a = x + 1;
3: else
4: a = x - 1;
5: if ( y > 0)*
6: b = y + 2;*
7: else*
8: b = y - 2;*
9: }
Suppose, the source lines of code identiﬁed with an
∗ are marked as impacted in phase I. There are two
conditional statement blocks, one block at lines 1 − 4
is controlled by the value of variable x, while the other
block at lines 5 − 8 is controlled by the value of vari-
able y. There are four possible symbolic paths in this
program:
1. (X > 0) ∧ (Y > 0)
2. (X > 0) ∧ ¬(Y > 0)
3. ¬(X > 0) ∧ (Y > 0)
4. ¬(X > 0) ∧ ¬(Y > 0)
Since the ﬁrst conditional block is not impacted by the
change, DiSE explores only one choice for the value of
x, i.e., explores the same path through the unimpacted
code ( X > 0 or ¬(X > 0)) for all program executions
through the unimpacted code. As a result, DiSE prunes
two of the paths shown above, e.g., it prunes 1 and 2, or
3 and 4. Which paths are pruned is determined by the
search strategy implemented by the symbolic execution
engine, e.g., random, greedy, default.
The resulting set of path conditions computed by
DiSE then characterizes the set of program execution
behaviors in the modiﬁed version of the procedure that
are impacted by the change(s). These path conditions
serve as the input to the change-impact analysis pre-
sented in Section 5.
4.2.3 Scalability and Limitations of DiSE
Scalability The use of symbolic execution to compute
impacted program behaviors is the primary factor af-
fecting the scalability of the DiSE algorithm. Recent
advances in reduction and abstraction techniques, con-
straint solving, raw computing power, and in the devel-
opment of novel reuse techniques such as [43,47], have
helped to improve the scalability of symbolic execu-
tion. These improvements to symbolic execution can be
leveraged to help improve the scalability of DiSE. The
smaller symbolic summaries computed by DiSE bene-
ﬁt the program analysis techniques which use the DiSE
results by reducing the scope of the analysis to the pro-
gram behaviors impacted by the diﬀerences.
Limitations The DiSE algorithm was originally im-
plemented as an intraprocedural analysis. In [34] we
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present iDiSE, an interprocedural version of our algo-
rithm. The current versions of the DiSE and iDiSE al-
gorithms do not compute the impact of changes to dy-
namically allocated data or changes to global data, e.g.,
ﬁelds in Java classes; however, we are working on a ver-
sion of the iDiSE algorithm to compute the impact of
these types of changes.
Other limitations of our change impact analysis are
related to the limitations inherent with the use of sym-
bolic execution. In Section 4.2.1 we explain how a user-
speciﬁed depth bound may be necessary to avoid in-
ﬁnitely long execution paths when the loop bounds are
unknown a priori. Other limitations related to symbolic
execution include the availability of the underlying the-
ories in the decision procedures used by the symbolic
execution engine. For example, to reason about non-
linear arithmetic and operations on complex data struc-
tures and library operations on those structures. It is
interesting to note that these limitations are actually
part of the motivation for DiSE – our goal was to avoid
the program structures which contribute to these lim-
itations whenever possible by exploring only the parts
of the symbolic execution space that is impacted by the
changes to the code.
5 Application
In previous work [28,34], we discuss how the results
of DiSE can be used to support regression testing tech-
niques and delta debugging techniques. The path condi-
tions generated by DiSE along impacted program state-
ments are solved to facilitate regression testing tasks.
We present an evaluation in [28,34] that demonstrates
how the solutions to the impacted path conditions can
be used for better test case selection and augmenting
the existing test suite compared to just using symbolic
execution. We also show how the output of DiSE can
be conﬁgured for generating test inputs that satisfy dif-
ferent coverage criteria, e.g., impacted branch coverage,
impacted statement coverage, among others. The infor-
mation about which constraints are generated at im-
pacted program locations can be used to improve the
eﬃciency of delta debugging as shown in [34]. We have
analyzed synchronous reactive components from the au-
tomotive as well as the avoinics domain. For example,
we have previously analyzed versions of the Altitude
Switch (ASW) application that turns power on to a
device of interest when the aircraft descents below a
threshold altitude above ground level. We have also an-
alyzed NASA’s On-board Abort Executive (OAE) that
models the Crew Exploration Vehicles’ prototype as-
cent abort handling software.
In this section, we discuss a new application of DiSE,
demonstrating its utility in maintaining a software health
management framework that uses a Bayesian network.
We demonstrate the value of the change-impact infor-
mation computed by DiSE in facilitating the process
of managing the health of the SWHM monitor as the
monitored software is changed. We ﬁrst present back-
ground information on Bayesian networks and discuss
the advantages of using Bayesian networks for software
health management. We then present an example soft-
ware health management system modeled as a Bayesian
network, and describe how the change-impact infor-
mation about the monitored software can be used to
help update and test the software health manager rep-
resented as a Bayesian network.
5.1 Bayesian Networks
Bayesian networks are used to reason about data in
the presence of uncertainty [11,25]. A Bayesian net-
work is a directed acyclic graph where the nodes in the
graph represent statistical variables in the system, and
the edges between the nodes represent dependencies be-
tween the diﬀerent variables in the system. Recent work
has explored using Bayesian networks to model soft-
ware health management systems [37–39]. The software
health manager monitors various software and hard-
ware systems. Data from the hardware and software
sensors is presented as evidence to the nodes in the
Bayesian network. Based on the data, the Bayesian net-
work reasons about failures and root causes for the fail-
ures in the system (hardware or software) being moni-
tored.
Bayesian networks contain multiple types of nodes
as used in this approach for SWHM. Each type of node
has a speciﬁc role in the system. Command nodes re-
ceive signals that are interpreted as commands. Sensor
nodes receive signals that provide data about the vari-
ables in the monitored hardware or software. Health
nodes indicate the health status of a sensor. Status
nodes encode the unobservable status of a particular
sub-system. And, behavior nodes connect various nodes
in the network in order to recognize behavioral pat-
terns.
Bayesian networks have several advantages for mod-
eling software health management systems. For exam-
ple, they have full forward and backward reasoning ca-
pabilities. In forward reasoning, the network calculates
the probabilities on the status of the health nodes based
on the values of the sensor nodes; this provides diag-
nosis and ‘most likely’ root cause explaining the cur-
rent data. In backward reasoning, when the network
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observes a certain diagnosis, it can reason about which
sensors are most likely broken.
5.2 Example Program
We use the example source code shown in Fig. 2 to
demonstrate the challenges of maintaining the health
of a software health manager in the context of evolving
systems (in this case, software changes). The code frag-
ment shown in Fig. 2 is a simpliﬁed version of the Wheel
Brake System (WBS). The WBS is a synchronous re-
active component derived from the WBS case example
found in ARP 4761 [18,35]. The Java code is based on
a Simulink model translated to C using tools developed
at Rockwell Collins and manually translated to Java.
The goal of this code is to determine how much braking
pressure to apply based on the environment. It consists
of one Java class and a total of 231 source lines of code.
The code shown in Fig. 2 is a simpliﬁed version of the
Java program.
Two versions of the method update(int PedalPos,
int BSwitch, int PedalCmd) are shown in Fig. 2. In
both versions of the program, the update method sets
the value of two global variables, AltPress and Meter,
based on the input values of its arguments. The ver-
sion on the left, Fig. 2(a), is the original version, and
the version on the right, Fig. 2(b), is the modiﬁed ver-
sion. The change to the code is on line 9 of the update
method in Fig. 2(b), where an additional else clause
is added to the update method. This code creates an
additional case for checking the value of PedalPos and
setting the value of PedalCmd.
An example Bayesian network for the code example
in Fig. 2 is shown in Fig. 3. The sensor nodes for the
input variables PedalPos, BSwitch, and PedalCmd are
labeled respectively in Fig. 3. The nodes in the Bayesian
network labeled with the preﬁx H are health nodes. For
example, H PedalPos is a health node that monitors the
health of the sensor node PedalPos. The node’s proba-
bilities give an indication about the health of the com-
ponent. The node usually has two states “healthy” and
“bad” where the summation of their probabilities is one:
p(healthy) + p(bad) = 1. The nodes in the Bayesian
network labeled with the preﬁx U are command nodes
that represent update variables in the system. Variables
in the system are identiﬁed by their node label. The ﬁ-
nal updates to the global variables ﬂow to the nodes
labeled AltPress and Meter in Fig. 3. The edges be-
tween the nodes represent dependencies. For example,
the updates to the PedalCmd variable in Fig. 2(a) are
only possible for certain values of PedalPos. The as-
signment of the value is contingent on the conditional
statements at line 5 or 7 in Fig. 2(a) evaluating to true.
U_AltPress
U_Meter
H_U_Meter
BSwitch Meter
AltPress
H_U_AltPressH_U_PedalCmd
PedalCmd H_PedalCmd
H_PedalPos
PedalPos
H_BSwitch
U_PedalCmd
Fig. 3 The Bayesian network for the example in Fig. 2.
For the purposes of maintaining the health of the
SWHM monitor, it is useful to identify the areas in the
Bayesian network that are not impacted by the changes
to the monitored code; these parts of the network do
not need to be re-analyzed or re-tested, potentially lead-
ing to a considerable savings in the maintenance costs.
Even just the basic ability to mark the impacted nodes
in the Bayesian network is useful because it facilitates
manual inspection of the network. In large Bayesian
networks, the impact analysis can be especially useful
to detect the parts of the network that are impacted by
the changes made to the monitored software.
By visual inspection of the graph in Fig. 3, we can
see that there are two disjoint graphs. The change at
line 9 in Fig. 2(b) corresponds to the shaded nodes
in Fig. 3. Without any additional information, we can
infer that all of the nodes in the top graph are impacted
by the changes, whereas the nodes in the bottom graph
are not impacted by the changes. In the next section,
we illustrate how the change-impact results computed
by DiSE can be used to mark the subset of the nodes
in the top graph of the Bayesian network in Fig. 3 as
impacted.
5.3 Running DiSE
The input to DiSE for the example shown is Fig. 2
is the modiﬁed program in Fig. 2(b) and the set of
modiﬁed source lines of code, which for this example is a
singleton set: {9 : else PedalCmd = PedalPos ∗1}. This
additional statement is added to the code in order to
cover all of the possible cases within the ﬁrst conditional
block. The set of modiﬁed source lines can be eﬃciently
computed using any source-level diﬀ tool.
The static analysis algorithm in DiSE is applied to
the modiﬁed version of the source code. The change to
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1: /∗ Global State Variables ∗/
2: int AltPress := 0
3: int Meter := 2
4:
int update(int PedalPos, int BSwitch, int PedalCmd)
5: if PedalPos == 0 then
6: PedalCmd = PedalPos + 1
7: else if PedalPos >= 1 then
8: PedalCmd = PedalPos + 2
9:
10: if PedalCmd == 1 then
11: AltPress = 0
12: else if PedalCmd == 2 then
13: AltPress = 1/4
14:
15: if BSwitch == 0 then
16: Meter = 1
17: else if BSwitch == 1 then
18: Meter = 2
1: /∗ Global State Variables ∗/
2: int AltPress := 0
3: int Meter := 2
4:
int update(int PedalPos, int BSwitch, int PedalCmd)
5: if PedalPos == 0 then
6: PedalCmd = PedalPos + 1
7: else if PedalPos >= 1 then
8: PedalCmd = PedalPos + 2
9: else PedalCmd = PedalPos ∗ 1
10:
11: if PedalCmd == 1 then
12: AltPress = 0
13: else if PedalCmd == 2 then
14: AltPress = 1/4
15:
16: if BSwitch == 0 then
17: Meter = 1
18: else if BSwitch == 1 then
19: Meter = 2
(a) (b)
Fig. 2 Code fragments from a simpliﬁed WBS example: (a) original version and (b) modiﬁed version.
the assignment of PedalCmd does not have any impact
on the block of statements at lines 16− 19 in Fig. 2(b)
because the value of PedalCmd is not used (read) at
those lines; however, the block of statements at lines
11−14 may potentially be impacted by the assignment
to PedalCmd at line 9. The value of PedalCmd at lines
11 and 13 is used to determine which code is to be ex-
ecuted, i.e., line 12 or line 14. As a result, at the end
of phase I of DiSE, the set of impacted statements will
include the following statements:
{
9 : else PedalCmd = PedalPos ∗ 1,
11 : if PedalCmd == 1 then,
12 : AltPress = 0,
13 : else if PedalCmd == 2 then,
14 : AltPress = 1/4
}
This set of impacted statements will then be used to di-
rect symbolic execution during the next phase of DiSE.
Recall that during symbolic execution of the modiﬁed
version of the code, checks are made to determine if any
impacted program statements are reachable from the
current program location. This ensures that only the
impacted execution behaviors are explored and charac-
terized. Let us consider the part of a path condition gen-
erated during symbolic execution along the impacted
set of program locations:
PedalPos = 0 ∧ PedalPos < 1 ∧ (PedalPos ∗ 1) == 1
The variable PedalCmd is replaced with the value as-
signed to it at line 9, PedalPos∗1. The constraint shown
above is, however, not satisﬁable, i.e., no assignment to
PedalPos will make the constraint satisﬁable. The ﬁrst
two constraints on PedalPos essentially specify that
PedalPos is a negative number which contradicts the ﬁ-
nal constraint. Similarly another partial path condition
generated along the impacted set of program locations
is:
PedalPos = 0 ∧ PedalPos < 1 ∧ (PedalPos ∗ 1) == 2
This path condition is also not satisﬁable. Based on the
results of symbolic execution we can then state conclu-
sively that the change made to the assignment of Ped-
alCmd does not impact the assignment to the global
variable AltPress. Both path conditions generated along
the impacted program locations in Fig. 2(b) show that
the change made to the assignment of PedalCmd does
not impact any other part of the program.
5.4 Impact of changes
The results of DiSE can now be used to color the im-
pacted nodes in the Bayesian network. Nodes PedalCmd
and U PedalCmd are initially marked as impacted by
the change in Fig. 3 based on the syntactic diﬀ. The
results of DiSE indicate that no additional nodes are
impacted by the change made to the monitored pro-
gram. This is a safe estimation of the impact of the
change, in the sense that the analysis does not miss
marking any impacted nodes. In other words, DiSE is
a precise and conservative technique for generating the
set of impacted program execution behaviors.
The application of DiSE results to the coloring of
the nodes in the Bayesian network is quite useful for
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manually inspecting the eﬀects of a change to the mon-
itored system. The size of the Bayesian network can
be very large when the monitored system is composed
of large numbers of variables. In such cases, the color-
ing of nodes is a helpful tool for visualizing the impact
of the changes. When only a small number of nodes is
impacted, it is easy to identify the parts of the net-
work that do not need to be re-analyzed and tested in
order to check their correctness. This can result in a
signiﬁcant savings while maintaining the health of the
monitor.
5.5 WBS Results
In this section, we present a subset of the results of an
evaluation of DiSE performed in [28]. Here we present
the results for theWBS example to illustrate how changes
to the code may impact the program execution behav-
iors. Note that the entire WBS program consists of one
method that is invoked from a main method. We refer
to the WBS method and WBS program interchange-
ably in this section. DiSE is implemented as an exten-
sion of the Java Pathﬁnder toolkit [44]. The details of
the implementation are described in Section 6. The goal
of the evaluation was to answer two research questions:
(RQ1) How does the cost of applying DiSE compare to
full symbolic execution on the changed WBS program?
(RQ2) How does the number of impacted path condi-
tions generated by DiSE compare with the number of
path conditions generated by full symbolic execution?
In Table 1, we list the results of running DiSE and
full symbolic execution on each version of the WBS ex-
ample. For each mutant (changed) version of WBS, we
list the number of CFG nodes changed (Changed) and
the number of CFG nodes impacted by the changes
(Impacted). We also present the following metrics—the
time to perform DiSE and the time to perform tradi-
tional symbolic execution of the mutant version as re-
ported by SPF, the number of states explored during
execution of each technique, and the number of path
conditions generated by each technique in the resulting
method summary. The results for DiSE are listed un-
der the subheading DiSE and the results for traditional
symbolic execution are listed under the subheading Full
Symbc.
To evaluate DiSE on the WBS program we needed
multiple versions of the program. We generated versions
of the WBS program by manually creating mutants of
the base version (v0) of WBS because multiple versions
of the WBS program are not available. When creating
mutants, we considered a broad range of changes that
can be applied to the code: change location, change
type and number of changes. We introduced changes
at the beginning, middle and end of the WBS method.
We also considered the control structures in the code,
and make changes at various depths in nested control
structures. Each mutant has one, two or three changed
Java statements, resulting in up to nine changed nodes
in the CFG for the changed version of the WBS pro-
gram as shown in Table 1. Versions 1–6 contain a single
changed Java source statement, versions 7–11 contain
two changed statements, and versions 12–16 contain
three changed statements.
5.5.1 Results and Analysis
RQ1 (Cost). In Table 1, we can see that for the major-
ity of versions in the WBS program, DiSE takes consid-
erably less time than full symbolic execution. In many
cases, the diﬀerences in time is several orders of magni-
tude. In the versions where the changes to the program
do not impact all path conditions (program paths),
DiSE takes at most 20% of the time taken by full sym-
bolic execution. In the versions v1, v7, v10, v14, and
v15, where DiSE explores the same number of states as
full symbolic execution, the time taken by DiSE is 9%–
30% longer than symbolic execution. This extra execu-
tion time accounts for the overhead of computing the
impacted locations and supporting data structures.
RQ2 (Eﬀectiveness). The number of path con-
ditions computed by DiSE varies greatly between the
diﬀerent versions of WBS. In the versions that DiSE
generates the same number of states as full symbolic
execution, the number of impacted path conditions are
the same as the ones generated by full symbolic execu-
tion. For most of the WBS versions, there fewer path
conditions generated by DiSE than full symbolic exe-
cution, e.g., DiSE generates half the number of path
conditions than full symbolic execution. There is a re-
duction in the number of path conditions generated for
other versions: v2, v4, v5, v6, etc.
Overall, the comparison demonstrates that DiSE
has potential application for detecting and character-
izing impacted program behaviors in evolving software.
In the WBS program, DiSE correctly identiﬁes and
characterizes the subset of path conditions computed
by full symbolic execution as impacted. In some in-
stances, the change impacted only a small percentage
of path conditions, and in others, the change(s) had a
much greater impact. When only a subset of the path
conditions were impacted by the changes, DiSE is able
to consistently compute the impacted path conditions
in less time—often several orders of magnitude—than
full symbolic execution; when all of the path conditions
were impacted by the changes, the overhead incurred by
DiSE is between nine and 30% for the WBS mutants.
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Version CFG Nodes Time (mm:ss) States Explored Path Conditions
Changed Impacted DiSE Full Symbc DiSE Full Symbc DiSE Full Symbc
v1 1 39 03:19 02:30 677,976 677,976 24 24
v2 1 7 00:08 02:22 93 677,976 17 24
v3 1 3 00:27 02:41 65,976 677,976 12 24
v4 1 0 00:08 02:44 17 677,976 1 24
v5 7 56 00:23 03:44 59,610 1,317,048 14 24
v6 1 1 00:08 02:44 17 677,976 1 24
v7 1 39 03:07 02:51 677,976 677,976 24 24
v8 8 57 00:29 03:45 59,610 1,317,048 14 24
v9 2 4 00:33 02:41 65,976 677,976 12 24
v10 2 39 03:40 02:51 677,976 677,976 24 24
v11 7 56 00:28 03:43 59,610 1,317,048 14 24
v12 8 65 00:31 03:54 70,129 1,317,048 6 24
v13 9 57 00:29 03:44 59,610 1,317,048 14 24
v14 3 39 03:39 02:51 677,976 677,976 24 24
v15 3 42 03:37 02:51 677,976 677,976 24 24
v16 8 56 00:28 03:43 59,610 1,317,048 14 24
Table 1 DiSE results for WBS
The entire WBS program is 231 lines of Java source
code. Since the WBS example is a single method, some
changes could impact the entire method. In larger ex-
amples, we expect that changes are more likely to be
localized to certain methods or components.
The results in this section illustrate the eﬀectiveness
of DiSE at characterizing the impact of changes on the
execution behaviors of the modiﬁed code. In the context
of software health management, these results illustrate
the potential to reduce the cost and eﬀort of maintain-
ing the correctness of the SWHM monitor when the
monitored code is changed by using DiSE.
6 Tool Support
DiSE is implemented within the Java Pathﬁnder [44]
toolkit. It is an extension of the symbolic execution en-
gine, Symbolic PathFinder [24,30].
6.1 Java PathFinder
The Java PathFinder (JPF) model checker is an open-
source Java bytecode analysis framework. The core of
JPF is an explicit state model checker for Java byte-
code. JPF is a customized Virtual Machine that sup-
ports state storage, state matching, and conﬁgurable
execution semantics of bytecode instructions. It sup-
ports controlled scheduling choices in concurrent pro-
grams, and monitoring of program executions with Ob-
server design patterns. It checks for properties such as
deadlock, race conditions, and the absence of unhandled
exceptions. One of the deﬁning qualities of JPF is its ex-
tensibility. JPF has been extended to support symbolic
execution, directed automated random testing, conﬁg-
urable state abstractions, various heuristics for enabling
bug detection, conﬁgurable search strategies, checking
of temporal properties and much more. JPF supports
these extensions at the design level through a set of
stable, well-deﬁned interfaces.
6.2 Symbolic PathFinder
Symbolic Pathﬁnder (SPF) is the symbolic execution
engine for JPF. SPF is an open-source execution en-
gine that symbolically executes Java bytecode. SPF
supports a variety of constraint solvers/decision pro-
cedures for solving path conditions such as Choco [8],
IASolver [16], and CVC3 [10]. In general, state match-
ing is undecidable when states represent path condi-
tions on unbounded input data. Hence, SPF does not
perform any state matching and explores the symbolic
execution tree using a stateless search. Furthermore, if
the solver is unable to determine the satisﬁability of
the path condition within a certain time bound, SPF
treats the path condition as unsatisﬁable. This limita-
tion of the constraint solvers may cause symbolic exe-
cution to not generate path conditions for feasible exe-
cution paths. Loops and recursion can be bounded by
placing a depth limit on the search depth in SPF or
by limiting the number of constraints encoded for any
given path; SPF indicates when one of these bounds
has been reached during symbolic execution.
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6.3 Directed Incremental Symbolic Execution
DiSE extends SPF by implementing the custom data-
ﬂow and control-ﬂow analyses used to compute the set
of impacted program statements. The control- and data-
ﬂow analyses compute a conservative approximation of
the impacted Java bytecode instructions in changed
methods in the modiﬁed program. The implementation
supports both intra-procedural analysis (data and con-
trol ﬂow within a method) and inter-procedural analy-
sis (data and control ﬂow across diﬀerent method calls).
The impacted Java bytecode instructions are used to di-
rect symbolic execution along execution paths leading
to impacted Java bytecode instructions, while the other
paths are pruned. DiSE is implemented in an extension
called jpf-regression. The output of DiSE is a set of
path conditions that describe the constraints over the
input and global variables. These constraints represent
the impacted program behaviors of the modiﬁed pro-
gram.
We use the impacted program behaviors to charac-
terize the impacted parts of the SWHM system manu-
ally. As part of our future work, we plan to automate
this process.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
Software health management techniques monitor de-
ployed software in its execution environment to detect
violations, predict possible failures, and to help the sys-
tem recover from faults. When the monitored software
is changed, the SWHM monitor software may also need
to change in order to continue to operate correctly. In
this work we describe how the results of Directed In-
cremental Symbolic Execution, a general change im-
pact analysis technique we developed previously, can
be used to maintain the correctness of a SWHM moni-
tor when the monitored software is changed. To the best
of our knowledge, existing software health management
techniques have not addressed the issue of maintaining
the correctness of the SWHM monitor over time as the
monitored software evolves.
The particular SWHM monitor software analyzed
in this work is based on Bayesian Networks. Although
we have automated the analysis to compute the impact
of the changes on the monitored software, we have not
yet automated the process for updating the nodes in the
Bayes Network to indicate the impact of the changes.
For future work, we plan to automate this step and to
apply DiSE to larger programs to empirically evaluate
the eﬀectiveness of this approach to maintaining the
health of the SWHM monitor software. We also plan to
explore how the results of DiSE can be used to support
other aspects of software health management, and to
apply DiSE results to other SWHM frameworks.
We believe that the core concept of DiSE can be
adapted and applied to other SWHM techniques as
well. An approach has been described for the formal
veriﬁcation for the diagnostics systems using symbolic
model checking [26]. The diagnosis system observes a
physical system that is modeled as a Kripke structure.
The DiSE algorithm could be adapted to generate the
set of aﬀected behaviors on the Kripke structure. The
impacted behaviors can then be used to check the cor-
rectness of the diagnosis system. There is another model-
based prognostic technique that uses a simulation of a
system collected under nominal, as well as degraded
conditions [22]. DiSE could be adapted to generate im-
pacted simulations of a system based on the changes.
The impacted simulations could then be used to help
maintain the prognostics system.
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